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THE ISSUE
The creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the banking union were in-
strumental in stemming the euro-area sovereign crisis. However, both remain incomplete. 
While the ESM reduces the risk of sovereign debt crises, it still lacks an instrument to deal 
in an orderly way with insolvency crises. This makes the no-bailout clause of the Maastricht 
Treaty toothless. Two of the banking union’s pillars – common European supervision by the 
European Central Bank and common European resolution by the Single Resolution Fund 
– are up and running. But the third, common European deposit insurance, is still missing. 
Furthermore, the governance of the ESM is wanting. Decisions to provide financial assis-
tance are taken by unanimity, preventing swift crisis response when it is needed.
POLICY CHALLENGE
The re-election of Chancellor Merkel and the election of President Macron create a new 
momentum for strengthening the euro area’s crisis framework. There is agreement to turn 
the ESM into a European Monetary Fund (EMF). We propose to design this EMF as part of 
a broader risk-sharing and market-discipline agenda. Risk sharing would come from the 
increased capacity of the EMF to intervene early in a sovereign or banking crisis and to act 
as a fiscal backstop to a complete banking union that includes European deposit insurance. 
Market discipline of sovereigns would come from the reduced exposure of banks to their 
home sovereigns and from a newly-established debt restructuring mechanism. The pro-
posed transformation of the ESM into an EMF should be viewed as part of a wider institu-
tional reform of the fiscal dimension of the euro area.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Sovereign debt crises and banking 
crises were not supposed to happen in 
the euro area. Or more precisely, the 
Maastricht Treaty, which established the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
contained no common provision to deal 
with a sovereign or banking crisis. The 
euro area was therefore totally unpre-
pared when it was hit first in 2008 by a 
banking crisis, then in 2010 by a sover-
eign debt crisis, and eventually by a sov-
ereign-bank ‘doom loop’ in which the 
vulnerability of sovereigns and banks 
was mutually reinforced. This vulnera-
bility seriously threatened the survival of 
the euro area.
The turning point came in 2012 with 
the creation of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and the first step 
towards a European banking union. 
These two political decisions effectively 
gave the space to Mario Draghi, 
president of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), to declare in July 2012 that: 
“Within our mandate, the ECB is ready 
to do whatever it takes to preserve the 
euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” 
Markets believed him and the sovereign-
bank ‘doom loop’ gradually dissipated.
Today, thanks to the decisions taken 
in 2012, the euro area is in a much better 
state than it was five years ago. But it 
remains vulnerable to future sovereign 
debt and banking crises because the 
ESM’s operations remain severely 
constrained and the banking union 
is still incomplete. Creating a better 
framework for managing crises should 
be the number one priority for euro-area 
leaders.   
Both French president Emmanuel 
Macron and German chancellor Angela 
Merkel agree that the ESM should be 
turned into a European Monetary Fund 
(EMF), but they seem to disagree on 
what its purpose should be1. Chancellor 
Merkel seems attracted by the idea 
that the EMF should be used to strictly 
enforce the fiscal rules, while President 
Macron appears to favour using the EMF 
as a euro-area stabilisation mechanism. 
While both ideas have merits, we argue 
in this Policy Brief that the EMF should 
concentrate, at least for the moment, on 
managing sovereign debt and banking 
crises, which still constitute the greatest 
potential threat to the euro area’s 
integrity.
2 EMU 1.0, EMU 2.0 AND REMAINING 
WEAKNESSES
Under the Maastricht rules, or EMU 1.0, 
each member country was supposed 
to take care of its own sovereign debt 
or banking problems. The Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), the only common 
instrument that existed besides the ECB, 
was for the surveillance (and correction) 
of public deficits by the European Com-
mission. There was no common instru-
ment in case a sovereign faced a liquid-
ity or solvency crunch. For banks, there 
was not even a common instrument for 
the surveillance of risk, and there was no 
common instrument in case of a liquid-
ity or solvency crisis. Everything was left 
in the hands of individual countries. The 
two columns headed EMU 1.0 in Table 1 
describe this architecture.
The situation changed radically 
after the euro area was hit by a series of 
banking and sovereign crises. National 
and European authorities were forced 
to acknowledge that a sovereign or 
banking crisis, let alone a sovereign-
cum-banking crisis, has implications 
for the entire area – even if it occurs 
in only one euro-area country. As a 
result, they gradually took steps to 
create new common tools for the 
surveillance of sovereigns and banks, for 
the management of sovereign debt and 
banking crises, and for the resolution of 
banking crises.
2.1 EMU 2.0: THE ESM, THE BANKING UNION 
AND THE OMT
Four major steps were taken after the 
start of the crisis:
1. The first was the reinforcement of the 
surveillance of public deficits and 
debts by the European Commission, 
with the two-pack and six-pack 
measures, and the Fiscal Compact 
of the intergovernmental Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance2. 
1. See, for instance, Münchau 
(2017).
2. The 2011 six-pack EU 
legislation, the 2012 Fiscal 
Compact and the 2013 two-
pack EU legislation aimed 
to reinforce the monitoring 
and surveillance of eco-
nomic policies and to im-
prove the enforcement of 
EU fiscal rules in euro-area 
countries. 
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2. The second step was the creation 
of the ESM, an intergovernmental 
instrument to provide financial 
assistance to euro-area countries 
with temporary financial problems. 
Membership of the ESM is restricted 
to countries that are part of the Fiscal 
Compact. Its current members are 
all the euro-area countries. The 
ESM offers three main facilities: 
lending to governments subject 
to a macro-economic adjustment 
programme (ex-post conditionality); 
precautionary financial assistance 
consisting of credit-lines available 
to countries that meet certain 
conditions (ex-ante conditionality); 
and lending for bank recapitalisation. 
3. The third step was the decision to 
create a European banking union 
to strengthen financial stability in 
the euro area. The banking union 
architecture will consist of three 
separate mechanisms: the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
and the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS). So far, only the first 
two mechanisms have been set up. 
Membership of the banking union 
is open to all EU countries, but only 
euro-area countries are members 
currently. After the creation of the 
Single Resolution Board (SRB) and 
its Single Resolution Fund (SRF), 
the ESM decided to extend its bank 
recapitalisation instrument, initially 
only available to governments, to 
banks under strict conditions (see 
section 2.2).  
4. The fourth step was the decision 
by the ECB to create the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) facility. 
The OMT programme allows the ECB 
to purchase government bonds on the 
secondary market subject to ex-post or 
ex-ante conditionality in the form of 
an ESM macro-economic adjustment 
programme or a precautionary credit 
line.
The current architecture, resulting 
from these four successive steps taken 
during the crisis, is described in the two 
columns entitled EMU 2.0 in Table 1.
2.2 WHY THE ESM NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED 
Although vastly superior to EMU 1.0, 
EMU 2.0 still suffers from three main 
weaknesses:
1. Treatment of sovereign debt: The new 
system reduces the risk of sovereign 
debt crises, partly thanks to the 
improved surveillance framework, 
and to a great extent thanks to the 
ESM’s lending capability (€500 billion) 
and the ECB’s OMT facility, which 
is potentially unlimited. With the 
ESM and the OMT, the new system is 
well equipped to deal with liquidity 
crises. However, it still lacks an 
instrument to deal in an orderly way 
with insolvency crises. That is a major 
weakness because it implies that the 
Maastricht Treaty’s no bail-out clause 
would remain toothless. Bailing out 
a country facing a liquidity problem 
is perfectly justified on economic 
grounds, but bailing out a country 
facing an insolvency problem must be 
credibly prohibited.
2. Incompleteness of the banking 
union: The SSM is fully up and 
running, and is functioning well, 
at least for significant banks 
(Schoenmaker and Véron, 2016). 
The SRB is also up and running, 
but the SRF is still in transition. In 
addition, use of the ESM’s direct 
recapitalisation instrument is 
subject to such strict conditions that 
it falls short of a credible ex-ante 
fiscal backstop to the SRF. Finally, 
there is still no agreement among 
governments to set up a European 
deposit insurance mechanism.
3. Governance of the ESM: Unlike the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
where decisions to provide financial 
assistance to a member country 
are taken by a majority vote, ESM 
decisions require unanimity and 
the prior approval of some national 
parliaments. The unanimity rule 
also applies for lending under the 
direct recapitalisation instrument. 
Consequently, in practice, ESM 
resources are only granted as a final 
resort. Earlier intervention, before 
a country loses market access and 
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provided it meets certain conditions, 
could mitigate or even prevent full-
blown crises, thereby saving money 
and jobs. The same logic applies to 
the direct recapitalisation instrument 
for banks.
3 TRANSFORMING THE EUROPEAN 
STABILITY MECHANISM INTO A 
EUROPEAN MONETARY FUND
The weaknesses of EMU 2.0 can be cor-
rected by turning the European Stability 
Mechanism into a European Monetary 
Fund. The EMF should be fully capa-
ble of acting as the fiscal counterpart 
of the ECB to guarantee the financial 
stability of the euro area in the event of 
a sovereign or banking crisis, or a threat 
of a crisis. This risk sharing function of 
the EMF must go hand-in-hand with 
the reduction of the risk of sovereign 
and banking crises. The creation of the 
SSM, which reduces the risk of banking 
crises, was an important step forward. 
Giving the EMF the responsibility 
for dealing with insolvent sovereigns 
would be equally important to reduce 
the risk of sovereign crises. Finally, 
introducing concentration charges or 
limits on the sovereign exposure of 
banks would reduce the risk of sover-
eign-bank ‘doom loops’.      
Turning the ESM into an EMF would 
solve major governance questions. It is 
important to integrate the governance 
of sovereign and bank crises within 
both the ECB and the EMF. The 
rationale for this is that ultimately the 
standing of a banking system depends 
on the strength of the fiscal authority 
behind it and on its ability to provide a 
fiscal backstop (Schoenmaker, 2017). A 
banking crisis can turn into sovereign 
crisis when the sovereign cannot offer a 
credible backstop to its banking system. 
In the euro area, the ECB can or should 
be able to prevent or to manage a 
sovereign or a banking crisis as long as 
it is a matter of providing liquidity on a 
temporary basis. Beyond that, it should 
be the responsibility of the EMF, as the 
fiscal agent of euro-area governments, 
to protect the stability of governments 
and banks.
In practice, the EMF should take 
over the existing responsibilities from 
the ESM, but expand them and adopt a 
different governance model.
The expansion of the EMF compared 
to the ESM should address the two 
channels of the sovereign-bank nexus: 
sovereign crises and banking crises.
3.1 THE EMF AND SOVEREIGN CRISES
In terms of the governance of sovereign 
debt crises, some, such as Germany’s 
former finance minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble, have argued that the EMF 
should take over from the European 
Commission the responsibility for sur-
veillance of the adherence to the fiscal 
rules (Schäuble, 2017). According to 
this view, the European Commission is 
too political and not sufficiently inde-
pendent from the countries it is meant 
to watch over to enforce the rules with 
sufficient rigour. However, it is doubtful 
that the EMF will be less political and 
more independent from its member 
countries than the European Commis-
sion. The ESM is certainly not. In fact, 
it is unlikely that any official European 
body – the Commission, the ESM or the 
EMF – could have the power (bestowed 
upon it by the member states) to strictly 
enforce the EU fiscal rules and com-
pletely avoid debt sustainability prob-
lems.
A more promising approach would 
be to give teeth to the no bail-out clause 
of the European treaty by setting up a 
European Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism to ensure orderly resolution 
in the euro area (see Gianviti et al (2010) 
for an early proposal). The creation 
of this mechanism would strengthen 
market discipline and help prevent 
future sovereign debt crises. 
The European Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism would have 
both an adjudication function and a 
financial function. It would be able 
to initiate and conduct negotiations 
between an insolvent sovereign debtor 
and its creditors, resulting in an 
agreement on how to reduce the present 
value of the debtor’s future obligations 
in order to re-establish the sustainability 
of its public finances. A special court 
"In practice, the 
EMF should take 
over the existing 
responsibilities 
from the ESM, but 
expand them and 
adopt a different 
governance model.
The expansion of 
the EMF compared 
to the ESM should 
address the two 
channels of the 
sovereign-bank 
nexus: sovereign 
crises and banking 
crises."
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3. Véron (2017) favours 
sovereign concentration 
charges or limits because 
these address the home 
bias problem and thus 
reduce the concentration 
risk. Moreover, concen-
tration limits would not 
put euro-area banks at a 
disadvantage compared to 
other banks.
4. The ECB is sole deci-
sion-maker on the granting 
or removal of all banking 
licenses in the banking 
union area, and for related 
decisions such as the 
vetting of changes in bank 
ownership and of newly 
appointed bank executives 
as 'fit and proper'. This 
is also true for the 3,520 
smaller banks that are 
considered 'less significant' 
meaning they fall below 
the threshold of €30 billion 
in total assets. For these 
banks, day-to-day super-
visory tasks are left to the 
national supervisor, but 
the ECB retains ultimate 
decision-making authority. 
In this capacity, the ECB 
can wield all the tools 
that are given to national 
supervisors by EU banking 
legislation (Véron, 2015).
would make the settlement between 
the debtor and creditors binding 
on all parties, provided it has been 
approved by a qualified majority of all 
creditors. The court would work in close 
partnership with the EMF, which would 
assess when a sovereign debtor has 
become insolvent, by how much its debt 
should be reduced, and what its future 
primary surplus should be to restore 
its debt sustainability. The EMF would 
also have the task of providing financial 
assistance to the debtor country to help 
it undertake the necessary economic 
adjustment towards fiscal sustainability. 
Such assistance should only be provided 
after an agreement between the debtor 
and the creditors re-establishing 
solvency has been reached.
We do not recommend that all 
EMF financial assistance should be 
conditional on debt restructuring. 
Rather we envisage that, like the 
ESM, the EMF would continue to 
lend money to solvent sovereigns that 
face temporary difficulties. Only in 
exceptional situations, when the EMF 
would have judged a sovereign to be 
insolvent and when the insolvency 
procedure by the arbitration arm of the 
European Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism has led to an agreement 
between the sovereign debtor and its 
creditors, should lending by the EMF be 
conditional on debt restructuring.  
The creation of the European 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism and the possibility of 
sovereign debt restructuring should be 
accompanied by significant changes 
in the regulatory treatment of banks’ 
sovereign exposures. As argued 
elsewhere (ESRB, 2015), this could take 
the form of risk weights or concentration 
limits on sovereign bonds held by 
banks3. Such changes would further 
strengthen market discipline and limit 
the risk of future sovereign debt crises 
(and the related redenomination risk). 
3.2 THE EMF AND BANKING CRISES
The second area in which the new EMF 
should have an expanded remit com-
pared to the current ESM is the govern-
ance of banking crises. Here the guiding 
principle should be to align incentives 
and responsibilities at the appropriate 
decision-making levels. Now that the 
ECB supervises significant banks directly 
and less significant banks indirectly4, it 
should also be responsible for Emergen-
cy Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to banks 
experiencing liquidity problems, a func-
tion currently carried by national central 
banks (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 
2014). 
The same guiding principle should 
apply to crisis resolution. The SRB is 
already in charge of resolution in the euro 
area and manages the SRF, which is still 
in a transition phase. A European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme should also be created 
and managed by the same institution 
that manages resolution, similarly to 
the Federal Deposit and Insurance 
Corporation in the United States. This 
new integrated EU body, which could 
be called the Single Resolution and 
Deposit Insurance Board, could apply 
the least cost principle, which requires 
the resolution authority to choose the 
resolution method with the least cost 
to the resolution and deposit insurance 
fund in terms of the total amount of 
expenditures and (contingent) liabilities 
incurred. The combination of functions 
would allow for swift decision-making 
(Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014). 
The role of the EMF would be to 
serve as a fiscal backstop to the euro-
area banking system. This would mean 
three things. First, the procedure 
for the implementation of the direct 
recapitalisation instrument should be 
simplified so it can actually be deployed 
when needed. Second, the EMF should 
be allowed (alone or with member 
states) to participate in precautionary 
recapitalisations. Third, the EMF should 
be able to provide a credit line to the 
Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance 
Fund, the new integrated fund in which 
the Single Resolution Fund and the 
European Deposit Insurance Fund would 
be combined, managed by the Single 
Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board, 
just as the US Treasury can provide, and 
has provided, to the Federal Deposit and 
Insurance Corporation. 
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It is important to note that the risk of 
moral hazard associated with the EMF 
acting as a fiscal backstop to the banking 
system would be much reduced if (i) 
the regulatory treatment of sovereign 
exposures by banks was tightened in 
conjunction with the creation of the 
European Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism, which effectively reduces 
redenomination risk, as proposed 
above; (ii) the non-performing loans 
were reduced and provisioning for them 
was increased as recently proposed by 
the ECB5; and (iii) deposit insurance 
premiums were risk based, as recently 
proposed by the European Commission6. 
The logic of our proposal is that 
the EMF should not deal only with 
sovereign crises or only with banking 
crises. It should deal with both in order 
to effectively prevent the reoccurrence of 
sovereign-bank ‘doom loops’.     
The proposed architecture of the new 
regime is described in the two columns 
entitled EMU 3.0 in Table 1.
Table 1: EMU governance: from Maastricht (EMU 1.0) to the EMF (EMU 3.0)
Function Sovereign debt Banks
(Institution 
in charge)
EMU 1.0 EMU 2.0 EMU 3.0 EMU 1.0 EMU 2.0 EMU 3.0
Surveillance SGP
Two-pack, 
six-pack, Fiscal 
Compact
Two-pack, 
six-pack, Fiscal 
Compact
Supervision Supervision Supervision
(Institution 
in charge)
(European 
Commission)
(European 
Commission)
(European 
Commission)
(national) (SSM-ECB) (SSM-ECB)
Crisis 
management
-
Euro-area loan 
& OMT
Euro-area loan 
& OMT
Lender of 
last resort
Lender of 
last resort
Lender of 
last resort
(Institution 
in charge)
- (ESM & ECB) (EMF & ECB)
(national 
ELA)
(national 
ELA)
(ECB ELA)
Crisis 
resolution 
- - SDRM
Resolution 
& deposit 
insurance
Resolution 
& deposit 
insurance
Resolution 
& deposit 
insurance
(Institution 
in charge)
- - (EMF) (national) 
(SRB & 
national)
(SRDIB 
with EMF)
Source: Bruegel. Note: ECB = European Central Bank; ELA = emergency liquidity assistance; EMF = European Monetary Fund; SDRM = Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism; SGP = Stability and Growth Pact; SSM = Single Supervisory Mechanism; SRB = Single Resolution Board; SRDIB = 
Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board.
3.3 THE GOVERNANCE OF THE EMF
The new role assigned to the EMF would 
require a new form of governance com-
pared to the ESM. The most important 
change would be to abolish the unanim-
ity rule that hampers ESM decisions. All 
EMF financial-support decisions, wheth-
er they involve governments, banks or the 
Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance 
Board, should be taken by a supermajor-
ity7. Beyond that, there is the question as 
to whether the EMF should be intergov-
ernmental like the ESM and the IMF, or 
a European institution like the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) or the ECB. Note, 
however, that the question of unanimity 
versus supermajority voting is separate 
from the question of intergovernmental 
versus European institutions. Unanimity 
is not required in the intergovernmental 
IMF or in the EU-treaty based ECB and 
EIB.
Establishing the EMF as an EU 
institution would give it greater European 
legitimacy. In the ESM, all the important 
decisions are taken by the Board of 
Governors, which is made up of the 
finance ministers of the Eurogroup. In 
the EMF, the Board of Governors could 
comprise the Eurogroup ministers and 
5. See https://www.banking-
supervision.europa.eu/
press/pr/date/2017/html/
ssm.pr171004.en.html.T
6. See https://ec.europa.
eu/info/publications/
commission-proposal-eu-
ropean-deposit-insur-
ance-scheme-edis_en.
7. There has been discussion 
as to whether this change 
would be compatible with 
the German legal order. The 
judgements of the German 
Federal Institution Court in 
Karlsruhe of 12 Septem-
ber 2012 (http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.
de/SharedDocs/Entsc-
heidungen/EN/2012/09/
rs20120912_2bvr139012en.
html) and of 18 March 2014 
(https://www.bundesver-
fassungsgericht.de/Shared-
Docs/Pressemitteilungen/
EN/2014/bvg14-023.
html) require Bundestag 
involvement for financial 
assistance decisions. That 
would remain possible as 
long as Germany was to 
retain a blocking vote (veto 
power), which could be the 
case with supermajority 
voting. But this would not 
fundamentally change the 
last-resort logic of the ESM. 
The only solution to solve 
this problem is to restrict 
the requirement to obtain 
prior approval from the 
Bundestag (or any other 
national parliament) to a 
capital increase of the EMF. 
As the liability of each EMF 
member would be limited 
to its portion of the EMF’s 
capital (as is the case with 
the ESM), we do not see a 
reason for separate approv-
al by national parliaments 
of individual financial 
assistance decisions.
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8. They note that “Germany 
needs to accept the idea of 
more risk sharing in the euro 
area – but should insist that 
this is done in a way that 
maintains sound incentives, 
does not become a vehicle 
of permanent redistribution 
and increases the credibility 
of the no-bailout rule for 
sovereigns and of the bail-in 
framework for banks… 
[and] France needs to accept 
the idea of more market 
discipline – but should insist 
that this is introduced in a 
way that does not lead to fi-
nancial instability” (Bénas-
sy-Quéré et al, 2017).
also a euro-area ‘finance minister’ and 
a few other representatives of the euro 
area, which would together constitute a 
‘Eurosystem of Fiscal Policy’ (Sapir and 
Wolff, 2015). The Eurosystem of Fiscal 
Policy would be a Community institution 
replacing the informal Eurogroup as 
the body responsible for all the fiscal 
decisions in the euro area and would also 
become the political counterpart of the 
independent ECB. The euro-area ‘finance 
minister’ and the other euro-area 
representatives would be appointed by 
the European Council subject to approval 
by the European Parliament, to which 
they would be accountable.
4 CONCLUSIONS
President Macron and Chancellor Merkel 
agree that the ESM should be turned into 
an EMF, but they seem to disagree on 
what its purpose should be. In a nutshell, 
Macron sees the EMF as an instrument 
for risk sharing, while Merkel sees it as a 
tool for risk reduction.
The president of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has 
often indicated, with reference to the 
banking union, that “it can only function 
if risk-reduction and risk-sharing go hand 
in hand” (Juncker, 2017). 
Meanwhile, a group of 15 French 
and German economists (see Bénassy-
Quéré et al, 2017) proposed a set of 
reforms for the euro area that also 
combines elements of market discipline 
and risk sharing. We share their view 
that Germany needs to accept the idea 
of greater risk sharing in the euro area, 
while France needs to accept the idea of a 
greater level of market discipline8.
Our proposal to transform the 
European Stability Mechanism into 
a European Monetary Fund seeks to 
achieve a balance between market 
discipline and risk sharing. The latter 
would come from the increased capacity 
of the EMF to intervene early in a 
sovereign or banking crisis, rather than 
to act only as a last resort, as is the case 
for the ESM, and from the EMF’s capacity 
to act as a fiscal backstop to a complete 
banking union that includes a European 
deposit insurance mechanism. Market 
discipline of sovereigns would come from 
the reduced exposure of banks to their 
home sovereigns and from the feasibility 
of using the EMF to restructure sovereign 
debts without a banking panic.
The transformation of the ESM into an 
EMF should not be viewed as a stand-
alone initiative. It should be considered 
as part of a wider institutional reform 
of the fiscal organisation of the euro 
area, which should be aimed at better 
managing sovereign and debt crises, and 
at improving economic conditions in less 
severe situations.
"Our proposal to 
transform the 
European Stability 
Mechanism into a 
European Monetary 
Fund seeks to 
achieve a balance 
between market 
discipline and risk 
sharing."
POLICY BRIEF  THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR A EUROPE AN MONETARY FUND8
© Bruegel 2017. All rights 
reserved. Short sections, not 
to exceed two paragraphs, 
may be quoted in the origi-
nal language without explicit 
permission provided that 
the source is acknowledged. 
Opinions expressed in this 
publication are those of the 
author(s) alone. 
 Bruegel, Rue de la Charité 
33, B-1210 Brussels 
(+32) 2 227 4210  
info@bruegel.org  
www.bruegel.org
REFERENCES
Bénassy-Quéré, A., M. Brunnermeier, L. Feld, M. Fratzscher, P. Martin, H. Rey, I. Schnabel, N. 
Véron, B. Weder di Mauro, J. Zettelmeyer, H. Enderlein, E. Farhi, C. Fuest, P. Gourinchas and 
J. Pisani-Ferry (2017) ‘A resilient Euro needs Franco-German compromise’, Bruegel Blog, 27 
September
ESRB (2015) ESRB report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures, European Systemic 
Risk Board, Frankfurt
Gianviti, F., A. Krueger, J. Pisani-Ferry, A. Sapir and J. von Hagen (2010) A European mechanism 
for sovereign debt crisis resolution: a proposal, Blueprint 10, Bruegel  
Goodhart, C. and D. Schoenmaker (2014) ‘The ECB as lender of last resort?’, VoxEU, 23 October 
Gros, D. and D. Schoenmaker (2014) ‘European Deposit Insurance and Resolution in the banking 
union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52: 529–546
Juncker, J.-C. (2017) State of the Union Address 2017, European Commission
Münchau, W. (2017) ‘Macron may have a bold vision but Merkel calls the shots’, Financial Times, 
1 October
Sapir, A. and G. Wolff (2015) ‘Euro-area governance: what to reform and how to do it’, Policy Brief 
2015/01, Bruegel
Schäuble, W. (2017) ‘Non-paper for paving the way towards a Stability Union’, 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Berlin
Schoenmaker, D. (2017) ‘Resolution of International Banks: Can Smaller Countries Cope?’, 
International Finance, forthcoming.
Schoenmaker, D. and Véron, N. (2016) European banking supervision: the first eighteen months, 
Blueprint 25, Bruegel 
Véron, N. (2015) Europe’s Radical Banking Union. Essay & Lecture Series, Bruegel
Véron, N. (2017) ‘The SCCR Proposal: A New Regime for Banks’ Sovereign Exposures’, Bruegel, 
forthcoming
